

### **Introduction from the Chair**

Greetings, esteemed delegates! Allow me to kindly say, first, welcome to the Security Council for FMUN 2022! And second, thank you for taking the time to invest in reading this accursed background guide in preparation for committee. My name is Joshua Spence-Lehmann, and I will be your chair for Security Council. I have been competing in Model United Nations since the spring of 2019 (with a notable gap during the Covid-19 pandemic). During each of the conferences I competed in, I found myself making new connections, and learning more about the world of realpolitik, even if it came in a rather controlled environment. At this conference, I aim to assist each of you in the pursuit of becoming better delegates, but more importantly, in making this experience a positive and fun one. While MUN decorum may have us depicting ourselves in a more serious nature, I hope you all will find yourselves comfortable with the idea of using this committee as a constructive experience and be willing to ask me questions regarding your performance. I will be happy to provide insight into your capabilities in public speaking, complex problem-solving, critical thinking, technical writing, and negotiation. That being said, let's get to it!

### **Introduction to the Committee**

The Security Council was one of the six original principal organs of the United Nations established by the UN Charter<sup>1</sup>. The first Security Council meeting was held in London, England on January 17th, 1946, before taking permanent residence at the United Nations headquarters in New York City.<sup>2</sup> The Security Council has a total of fifteen members<sup>3</sup>. Five of them are permanent members who have held their seats since the first meeting, and they have the power to unilaterally veto any non-procedural resolutions.<sup>4</sup> The remaining ten members are elected by the United Nations General Assembly to two years terms.<sup>5</sup> In order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council has the ability to investigate international disputes, impose economic sanctions, and authorize the use of military force.<sup>6</sup>

### **An Open Agenda**

Due to the nature of the Security Council and its critical mission to address threats to peace and security around the world, this committee will have an open agenda. Delegates are responsible for identifying relevant issues and topics and presenting them to the body for discussion. Your position papers for the committee should present your Member State's position, policies, and recommendations on the two topics you wish to present to the committee. An example topic is

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<sup>1</sup> "Charter of the United Nations," June 26th, 1945

<sup>2</sup> "What is the Security Council?" United Nations, accessed September 29th, 2021  
<https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/what-security-council>

<sup>3</sup> "Charter of the United Nations," June 26th, 1945

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> "What is the Security Council?" United Nations, accessed September 29th, 2021  
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provided below, without a Member State position, and a motion can be made to adopt this example topic onto the agenda as well as any other topic presented by you and your fellow delegates. However, the Secretary-General and the Security Council Director highly encourage the delegates to set their own agenda and will only influence debate when absolutely necessary.

### **Setting the Agenda for FMUN SC**

After the roll call of the first committee session, the director will open discussion of the agenda. Delegates may make formal speeches, and move for a moderated or unmoderated caucus to discuss proposed and potential topics for the body. The chair will then entertain a motion to set the agenda.

A motion can only name one potential agenda item, and motions will be voted on in the order in which the chair receives them. Security Council voting rules set forth in the UN Charter require nine affirmative votes from the Council in order for a motion to pass. The first to pass will become the agenda item of discussion until the item is closed, either through voting or tabling of the item. Should time permit, the SC will move back into a discussion of setting the agenda at the conclusion of each agenda item.

When naming a topic for discussion, be mindful of your wording, as this will affect how expansive or narrow your discussion will be. A motion to address civil unrest on the continent of Africa is a much more broad topic than a motion to discuss "Civil and Border Conflicts over Ethnic Tensions in Ethiopia" a broad topic maybe be difficult to find enough support to adopt as a discussion on the agenda and even if it is adopted by an affirmative vote of nine members of the Council, the Council may struggle to conclude the discussion in the limited time we have for the committee sessions. The more specific a discussion item is, the more likely you will be able to find support that can end in the passage of a resolution.

### **Procedure for FMUN SC**

**Voting-** Voting procedure within committee will mirror the rules put forth in the UN charter. In SC, there are two types of votes: Procedural and Substantive Votes. Substantive votes are votes on draft resolutions, amendments, and the second vote on the division of questions. In addition to the nine votes required to pass a motion, substantive votes require concurring votes (yes or abstention) from the five permanent members of the SC (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). A resolution cannot pass should a P5 member vote no but could still pass so long as the resolution has the minimum of nine affirmative votes.

**Veto and Double Veto-** China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are the five permanent Member-States of the Security Council and as such, have the privilege to veto any substantive votes. Should a P5 member vote no on a substantive vote, the motion fails. A substantive vote can still pass if a P5 member decides to abstain so long as the resolution receives a minimum of nine affirmative votes. Though rare, a P5 member may challenge the SC Director's ruling that an issue is procedural. The SC then holds a substantive vote on whether the issue is procedural or not. The challenging or any P5 member can veto (vote no on) this substantive vote on the procedural question. Once vetoed, the procedural vote on the original motion becomes a substantive vote, which can then be vetoed. This is known as the double veto. Double vetoes are seldom used in committee. Your chair also has the right to limit the usage of the double veto on procedural issues that have little to no impact on the course of debate, such as the setting of the speaker's time and the suspension of debate. To properly execute the usage of a double veto a P-5 delegate should raise their placard after a motion has been made, but before a vote is completed. It would go as follows:

*"The delegate from China moves to declare this motion a procedural motion."*

For Example:

*"The Delegate from Ethiopia moves for a discussion of the Biological and Chemical Weapons."*

The Delegate from China raises their placard in their left hand and is recognized:

*"The Delegate from China moves to declare this motion a procedural motion."*

**Outside Parties-** Under Article 32 of the UN Charter, delegates from non-Member States may be invited to participate in discussions on agenda items that affect the non-Member States.<sup>7</sup> However, non-Member States are unable to vote. SC delegates maybe move to invite a representative from a non-Member State to participate in relevant discussion items. Any proposed motion under Article 32 must first be brought to the attention of the committee staff so that FMUN staff can determine if such a request can be honored. Even with staff approval, the motion still needs to pass with nine affirmative votes from the Council.

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<sup>7</sup> "Security Council, SC, UNSC, Security, Peace, Sanctions, Veto, Resolution, President, United Nations, UN, Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, Conflict Resolution, Prevention." United Nations, United Nations, [www.un.org/en/sc/members/](http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/)

## Addendum: Example Topic

### **Topic 1- Preventing Civil and Border Conflicts over Ethnic Tensions in Ethiopia:**

#### **Introduction and History:**

Ethiopia, a landlocked country in the horn of Africa, is one of the oldest civilizations in the world, with a datable history from 1000 BC [7]. Having never been colonized, the country was ruled by successive emperors until Haile Sellasie, the last emperor, was removed from power in 1974 after 15 years of his reign being stained by protests over the distribution of land and the lack of development, with these events being magnified by repeated crop failure and famine. With Ethiopia featuring near 70 different ethnic groups, separatist sentiment and movements are not foreign to the country, with Sellasie having to deal with armed uprisings in the region of Eritrea, and having been eventually overthrown via military coup and replaced by a pro-Soviet Union, Marxist-Leninist military junta known as the “Derg”, which was led by Mengitsu Haile Mariam.

The Derg, once in power, established a one-party communist state, and initiated the “Red Terror”, which entailed the expunging of other communist groups in Ethiopia from 1974-1978. Over time, however, resistance grew throughout the country, with the Derg facing intrastate conflict between 1976-1991. Many disparate groups, whether they had the goal of overthrowing the government or fighting for independence, found themselves unified against the Derg as a common enemy. After years of conflict, the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) seized power with cooperation from Eritrean separatists and forced Mengistu to flee the country. In turn, after a referendum in 1993, Eritrea became formally independent from Ethiopia. While in power, the EPRDF was dominated by the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), which was based in the Tigray region, which only encompassed 10% of the country’s population. This forced the EPRDF to secure its dominant position in other regions of the country in other ways, leading to the writing of a new decentralized constitution. This, however, did not lead to long term success, as the peoples within the outer regions were disenchanting with the new government, complaining that the new constitution was superficial, and was designed to conceal that the real power still remained within the Tigray region. Conflicts re-ignited in the Afar, Oromyia, and Ogaden regions.

TPLF dominance over the Ethiopian government was lost in 2018, following the resignation of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn after mass protests began in 2016. In April 2018, Abiy Ahmed, an Oromo Politician, took the role of prime minister and chairman of the EPRDF, thus further weakening the grasps of power the Tigrays had, while maintaining the control in government that the EPRDF had.

Ethiopia has also seen conflicts with its neighboring states. Between the 1960’s to the 1980’s, Ethiopia warred with Somalia over the Ethiopian Ogaden region. 1998 found an interstate conflict erupting with the now neighboring Eritrea over the two countries’ common border, leading to relations between the two neighboring deteriorating as the two states failed to mediate the issue, and a conventional war ensued. The conflict ended in 2000, but the issue on the border remained problematic. Eventually, the two parties signed a peace treaty in September of 2018, following Ethiopia’s announcement that it was willing to abide by a boundary commission arbitration from 2002 that was previously rejected.

## **Current Situation:**

As recently as two years ago, the situation in Ethiopia seemed to be taking a turn for the better. Abiy Ahmed, the new Prime Minister, seemed to signify a new beginning, one unmarred by the history of repressive rule. In lieu of this hope, fighting transpired for over a year between the federal army and forces from the northern Tigray region. Abiy initially ordered his troops into Tigray in November of 2020, after supporters of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the region's ruling party, led an attack on a federal military garrison. Federal forces backed by forces from both Eritrea and the Ethiopian Amhara region, which borders Tigray, immediately advanced and implemented an interim administration in the Tigrayan capital of Mekele by the end of December. Not so easily defeated, members of TPLF regrouped and rallied in the countryside, recruiting Tigrayans outraged by the unfair treatment and unforgivable actions committed by the federal forces and their allies, including mass massacres, pillaging and rapes. The newly expanded rebel forces marched on Tigray and drove the majority of their enemies out, before setting their sights on southern lands. An insurgent group centered in the populous Oromia region declared their intent to be allies, and thus the rebel powers joined forces. However, a counteroffensive launched by federal forces and allied powers forced the Tigray rebels back to their own home region.

Both sides of this conflict are relatively equally matched, both sides have abundant supporters willing to aid the individual causes. It will be difficult for either side to effectively win this conflict due to the mass support on either side. Abiy paints a picture of this conflict as the battle crucial to ensuring the survival of the Ethiopian state, and describes the leaders of TPLF as power hungry and selfish; dedicated to the dismantling of the modernized vision many want for the country. Most Ethiopians outside of the Tigray region despise the TPLF for both the prolonging of a brutal fight and also fear their reputation, which historically was a brutal regime that ruled for decades before Abiy was elected. Alternatively, Tigrayan leaders appeal on the grounds that Abiy's intended reforms violate the right for regional sovereignty, and fear the federal government wants to water down the individual rights of Ethiopian citizens. They also claim their original attack that triggered the events of the war was warranted, as they had reason to believe Abiy and Eritrean President, Isias Afwerki, were working on a campaign to subjugate Tigray. The wounds of this war go far deeper than just the body counts, and statistics of war. The social cohesion of Ethiopia is no longer intact. Deep mistrust and hatred has formed between members of the same state, and advanced and swift movement by the Security Council is needed to salvage the future of the state.

## **Conclusion:**

This war is not a sustainable path for Ethiopia to continue on, thousands of people have been killed, including innocent bystanders, millions of Ethiopians have been displaced and forced to flee their homes. Both of the conflicting sides have been accused of atrocities. Federal authorities refuse to offer aid to most of Tigray's citizens, and Tigray is reaching a dangerous point, where most of its inhabitants are starving.

The conflict has begun spill over and threatens to destabilize any sense of peace in the surrounding region. Disputes between Sudan and Ethiopia over the territory of al-Fashqa and the Nile River's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam can become inflamed by the unrest within the region with Egypt and Sudan gaining to benefit from the violence.

However, recent developments give a glimpse at what could lead to some semblance of peace. Tigrayan leaders have announced conditions for peace talks, including the demand for Amhara forces to retreat from disputed areas they occupy in western Tigray. In the final days of 2021, the federal government announced a pause in their advancement against Tigrayan forces. This action of

de-escalation have provided the possibility for peace talks and the coordination of humanitarian aid in the Tigray and finally end the bloodshed before it spreads further.

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